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To Protect Freedom of Expression, 
Why Not Steal Victory from the  
Jaws of Defeat? 
Evelyn Mary Aswad* 
Abstract 
Global social media platforms are grappling with whether 
to align their corporate speech codes with international human 
rights law. Facebook’s June 2019 report that summarized 
worldwide feedback about its proposed independent oversight 
board for content moderation noted a split in stakeholder 
opinions on this topic. The UN’s top expert on freedom of 
expression as well as many civil society members recommended 
that Facebook anchor its content moderation in the 
international human rights law regime. Others expressed 
concern that this legal regime would not be sufficiently 
protective of speech and contained inconsistencies that create 
problems for content moderation. 
Those concerns were linked to a recent scholarly call for 
updates to the UN’s international legal regime regarding 
 
    *  The author is the Herman G. Kaiser Chair in International Law and 
the Director of the Center for International Business & Human Rights at the 
University of Oklahoma’s College of Law. Previously, she was the director of 
the human rights law office at the U.S. Department of State (2010–2013) and 
served as an attorney-adviser in that human rights law office from  
2004– 2009. The author wishes to thank Stanford University’s Global Digital 
Policy Incubator for inviting her to participate in a variety of events in which 
issues at the intersection of content moderation and international human 
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this Article. The author also wishes to thank her research assistant, Bailey 
Betz, for his excellent assistance with this Article. The views are solely those 
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610 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 609 (2020) 
 
freedom of expression, particularly with respect to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination. This Article examines the scholarly call’s 
analysis to assess whether its conclusions are correct, which 
would make this body of law less useful for platforms to adopt 
in content moderation. 
This Article finds that the state of international law on 
freedom of expression is more protective of speech (and more 
coherent) than the scholars assessed and proposes ways to 
achieve their laudable goal of promoting broad protections for 
freedom of expression in international law. The Article 
concludes that the existing international legal regime on 
freedom of expression remains a useful resource for content 
moderation by global platforms. 
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I. Introduction 
In the midst of controversy regarding how global social 
media platforms curate user-generated content,1 these 
companies are considering whether they should align their 
speech codes for online content with international law 
standards on expression. For example, in June 2019, Facebook 
released a report that summarized worldwide feedback on its 
proposed independent oversight board, which will review some 
of the platform’s content moderation decisions.2 The Facebook 
 
 1. See, e.g., Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202:  Lawmakers Plan to 
Ratchet Up Pressure on Tech Companies’ Content Moderation Practices, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/K7CX-BHXX (discussing a variety of 
criticisms of platform content moderation with respect to potentially harmful and 
offensive speech) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See FACEBOOK, GLOBAL FEEDBACK & INPUT ON THE FACEBOOK 
OVERSIGHT BOARD FOR CONTENT DECISIONS 10–37 (2019), 
https://perma.cc/2W84-6XAX (PDF) [hereinafter FACEBOOK REPORT] 
(summarizing views of external stakeholders on a variety of aspects of the 
proposed oversight board). In November 2018, Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg proposed the establishment of an independent body that would 
assess speech issues on the company’s platform. Id. at 4. Harvard Law 
School Professor Noah Feldman had initially proposed the idea of a Facebook 
“Supreme Court” to ensure an “independent decision-making process based 
on a formal commitment to freedom of expression” to adjudicate speech 
issues arising from content generated by the billions of individuals who use 
the platform. Id. at 8. In January 2019, Facebook issued a proposed charter 
for the new body (the “Oversight Board”) and conducted six months of 
consultations throughout the world to receive feedback. Id. at 4–5. The 
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report notes that the United Nations’ (UN) top expert for 
freedom of expression and members of civil society,3 including 
myself,4 advocated for use of international human rights law’s 
free expression protections in the Oversight Board’s review of 
the company’s global content moderation decisions.5 These 
stakeholders generally linked their views to the UN Guiding 
Principles for Business & Human Rights6 (UNGPs), a 
framework that sets forth the international community’s 
expectations for corporations when their operations intersect 
with human rights issues.7 Under the UNGPs, companies are 
 
Oversight Board’s mandate will cover content decisions made by the 
company under its corporate speech code (i.e., the Community Standards) 
and not content removals based on compliance with local laws. Id. at 35. 
 3. See id. at 34 (discussing external stakeholder support for Facebook 
to adopt UN human rights standards in content moderation). Civil society 
groups have also called for the creation of “social media councils” that would 
provide independent oversight over the content moderation of all platforms. 
See id. at 8 (“[An NGO called] Article 19 has proposed establishing a 
multi-stakeholder and industry-wide “Social Media Council,” which shares 
some similarities with the Oversight Board proposed by Facebook.”); 
STANFORD GLOBAL DIGITAL POLICY INCUBATOR, ARTICLE 19, & UNITED NATIONS 
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION, SOCIAL MEDIA 
COUNCILS: FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY 10 (2019), https://perma.cc/X2CG-
QZYQ (PDF) (endorsing the creation of social media councils grounded in 
international human rights law principles for freedom of expression). On 
September 17, 2019, Facebook released the charter for its Oversight Board, 
which states that “the board will pay particular attention to the impact of 
removing content in light of human rights norms protecting free expression.” 
FACEBOOK, OVERSIGHT BOARD CHARTER 5 (2019), https://perma.cc/5J3L-THD7 
(PDF). It remains to be seen how Facebook’s Oversight Board will interpret 
this mandate and if other platforms will seek to align their content 
moderation with international human rights standards. 
 4. See FACEBOOK REPORT, supra note 2, at 43 nn. 250 & 257 (citing 
Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE 
L. & TECH. REV. 26 (2018)). 
 5. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
 6. John Ruggie, Rep. of the Special Representative of the Sec’y-Gen. on 
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corps. and Other Bus. 
Enters., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter UNGPs]. 
 7. See Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4, at 
2 (July 6, 2011) (endorsing “the Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect, and Remedy’ 
Framework”); see generally UNGPs, supra note 6 (introducing and explaining 
the UN Guiding Principles). 
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expected to “respect” the human rights in key UN instruments8 
in their business operations, which means they “should avoid 
infringing on the human rights of others” and “should address 
adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.”9 
Facebook’s report, however, noted that other stakeholders 
raised concerns about anchoring content moderation to 
international human rights law.10 For example, one 
stakeholder expressed concerns that human rights law could 
affect how Facebook “balances users’ security and trust against 
freedom of expression.”11 The concerns included whether 
international human rights law might be too protective of 
speech and thus limit Facebook’s ability to remove speech that 
offends individuals and advertisers who use the platform.12 On 
 
 8. Principle 12 of the UNGPs calls on business enterprises to respect 
“international human rights” that are defined to include the International 
Bill of Human Rights (i.e., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights) as well as the principles 
concerning fundamental rights set out in the International Labor 
Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
UNGPs, supra note 6, at 13. The official commentary to Principle 12 states 
that businesses may also need to refer to additional UN human rights 
instruments. Id. at 13–14. 
 9. Id. at 13. The U.S. government has endorsed the UNGPs and 
encouraged their implementation by American companies. U.S. Dep’t of 
State, Bureau of Democracy, H. R. and Lab., U.S. Government Approach on 
Business and Human Rights 4 (2013), https://perma.cc/BTN8-YWEY (stating 
the U.S. government’s position that the UNGPs should serve “as a ‘floor’ 
rather than a ‘ceiling’ for addressing issues of business and human rights”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); U.S. GOVERNMENT, 
RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT: FIRST NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17 (2016), https://perma.cc/Q95N-FQ8Q (PDF) 
(encouraging businesses to use “the UN Guiding Principles as a floor rather 
than a ceiling for implementing responsible business practices”). 
 10. See FACEBOOK REPORT, supra note 2, at 34 (noting that other 
stakeholders “felt that focusing exclusively on a human rights framework 
would not be enough to adjudicate hard cases”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See FACEBOOK, GLOBAL FEEDBACK AND INPUT ON THE FACEBOOK 
OVERSIGHT BOARD FOR CONTENT DECISIONS: APPENDIX 123–24 (2019), 
https://perma.cc/6YT9-UGSW (PDF) (noting concerns of external 
stakeholders that adherence to international free expression standards 
would require Facebook to protect speech that it otherwise would remove 
from its platform under existing rules and policies). 
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the other hand, another stakeholder cautioned that social 
media companies may not be well-served by anchoring their 
private speech codes to existing international human rights 
law principles because of concerns that this body of law 
contains conflicting norms and may insufficiently protect 
speech.13 In articulating these concerns, this stakeholder cited 
a 2017 article titled The Right to Insult in International Law.14 
In that article, the authors eloquently present their vision 
for broad protections for freedom of expression under 
international law and call for revisions to the regime.15 After 
an excellent survey of domestic laws from around the world 
that fail to protect the “right to insult” rulers, religion, or 
royalty,16 the article examines international standards and 
contends that they not only fail to afford insults sufficient 
protection, but also provide inconsistent guidance on 
 
 13. See FACEBOOK REPORT, supra note 2, at 34–35 (stating that others 
took the position that the international “human rights law [regime] is not ‘a 
single, self-contained and cohesive body of rules.’ . . . ‘[T]hese laws are found 
in a variety of international and regional treaties that are subject to differing 
interpretations by states that are parties to the convention as well as 
international tribunals that apply the laws.” (quoting Evelyn Douek, U.N. 
Special Rapporteur’s Latest Report on Online Content Regulation Calls for 
‘Human Rights by Default,’ LAWFARE BLOG (June 6, 2018, 8:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/2FZU-4H5T (last visited Mar. 18, 2020) (noting as well that 
some commentators are concerned that international freedom of expression 
standards may not protect speech enough) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 14. Amal Clooney & Philippa Webb, The Right to Insult in International 
Law, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
 15. See id. at 47–51 (calling for a revised international law approach to 
speech that is inspired by the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment); see also 
Alan Wehbé, Increasing International Legal Protection for Freedom of 
Expression, 8 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 44, 59 (2018) (arguing for a 
new treaty on freedom of expression because of concerns that the current 
regime is not sufficiently protective of speech and not effective in changing 
problematic governmental approaches to speech). 
 16. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 3–13 (discussing domestic 
laws that use criminal defamation, sedition, hate speech, “fake” news, and 
public order as a justification to quash criticism of rulers; criminal 
blasphemy as well as laws protecting religious feelings to prevent insults to 
religions; and criminal bans on exhibiting disrespect for royalty). 
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permissible restrictions for such offensive speech.17 To achieve 
broader speech protections, the authors recommend several 
approaches at the international level.18 For example, they call 
on states to seek amendments to existing treaty text or enter 
reservations to particular treaty provisions,19 with the 
ultimate goal of nudging international law closer to U.S. First 
Amendment protections for speech.20 The authors conclude by 
recommending that social media companies respect the 
international human rights law regime in assessing speech 
issues on their platforms, but that they do so by incorporating 
the authors’ proposed updates to the regime.21 
While I share the authors’ laudable goal of promoting the 
broadest possible international protections for freedom of 
expression, I write this Article to advance the proposition that 
the state of international law on the ability of individuals to 
insult or otherwise engage in offensive speech is not bleak, as 
portrayed in their article, but rather this body of law contains 
robust and principled speech protections.22 This Article also 
notes that a number of the authors’ recommended solutions 
may not be necessary or feasible, proposes more fruitful ways 
forward in achieving their laudable goal, and defends the 
 
 17. See id. at 37 (“[T]he right to insult is not sufficiently protected under 
international law . . . . [I]nternational standards have proved to be 
confusing . . . .”). 
 18. See infra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 19. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 53–54 (calling for deletion of 
Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and 
for states to opt out of Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights). 
 20. See id. at 51 (“We believe that international law on insulting speech 
should be applied in a manner that is . . . more protective of speech, in line 
with the approach espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court under the First 
Amendment.”). 
 21. See id. at 54 (advocating that their proposed revisions to the 
international human rights law regime on expression “should also guide the 
private sector when they are requested to remove online content because it is 
considered insulting by a person, institution, or government”). 
 22. Compare infra Part II, with Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at  
37–51 (describing the current speech regime in international law and 
criticizing its inefficacy). 
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utility of the existing international legal regime in content 
moderation by private platforms.23 
Part II of this Article explains why the current state of 
international law affords more robust protections for insulting 
speech than Clooney and Webb claim as well as why 
international standards are generally consistent on this topic. 
Part III evaluates the authors’ recommendations for action at 
the international level and finds they may not reflect the best 
way to achieve the authors’ important goal. Part III also 
proposes that the most fruitful path for protecting the ability of 
individuals to engage in insulting or otherwise offensive speech 
(and, more generally, to promote broad free expression 
protections) involves seizing victory from the jaws of defeat by 
invoking and promoting existing UN treaty texts and positive 
interpretations from the UN human rights machinery on 
freedom of expression. Part IV concludes by reaffirming the 
utility of this body of international law as a key resource in 
global corporate content moderation. 
II. The Current State of International Law on Insults or 
Otherwise Offensive Speech 
The authors of The Right to Insult in International Law 
highlight that the key international human rights treaty 
provisions involving freedom of expression are Articles 19 and 
20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights24 
(ICCPR) as well as Article 4 of the Convention on Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination25 (CERD).26 The authors 
conclude that these provisions provide insufficient protection 
 
 23. See infra Parts II, III, IV. 
 24. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 19, 20, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 178 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 25. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 4, S. Exec. Doc. C, 
95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 218 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) 
[hereinafter CERD]. 
 26. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 15–19 (discussing 
international law’s protections for expression as well as its mandatory bans 
on hateful speech). 
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for insulting speech27 and that the interpretative guidance 
with respect to these provisions is conflicting.28 However, their 
overview of these treaty provisions did not include an analysis 
of ICCPR Article 19’s rigorous tripartite test for speech 
restrictions or a number of key interpretations issued by the 
UN human rights bodies charged with monitoring 
implementation of those treaties.29 ICCPR Article 19’s 
tripartite test, buttressed by the UN machinery’s 
recommended interpretations, places a substantial legal 
limitation on the discretion of states to restrict speech, 
particularly on the topic of insults to rulers, religion, and 
royalty.30 
Part II.A discusses how ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test 
helps achieve the authors’ goal of promoting broad protections 
for expression, including insulting or otherwise offensive 
speech. Part II.B explains why it is inappropriate to conflate 
interpretations of the UN’s international human rights 
machinery with those issued by regional bodies in order to 
conclude that the UN’s international law standards are 
inconsistent. In addition, Part II.B demonstrates that the cited 
inconsistences within the UN watchdogs’ interpretations of 
freedom of expression are more suitably attributed to an 
evolution in the thinking of these bodies over time rather than 
unworkable inconsistencies. 
 
 27. See, e.g., id. at 16 (asserting that the relevant human rights law 
treaty provisions “allow insulting speech to be silenced if it constitutes 
discriminatory ‘hate speech’ targeting minorities on the basis of race, 
nationality or religion even if there is no criminal intent or risk that it will 
lead to violence”); id. at 38 (concluding that ICCPR Article 20(2) and CERD 
Article 4 mandate overly broad restrictions on speech). 
 28. See id. at 44–47 (outlining the inconsistencies between the UN 
human rights machinery and regional human rights mechanisms). 
 29. See id. at 15–21 (discussing the history and a textual analysis of 
ICCPR Articles 19 and 20 as well as CERD Article 4). Similarly, another 
scholar who recently called for updates to the international legal regime on 
freedom of expression concluded that the existing regime was insufficiently 
protective of speech without analyzing or discussing ICCPR Article 19’s 
tripartite test for speech restrictions. Wehbé, supra note 15, at 50–53. 
 30. See Evelyn M. Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 
17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 26, 35–37 (2018) (introducing, defining, and 
discussing the mechanics of the ICCPR Article 19 tripartite test). 
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A. ICCPR Article 19’s Tripartite Test and Its Impact on Bans 
on Insulting or Offensive Speech 
ICCPR Article 19(2) provides broad protections for speech 
by declaring an expansive right to seek and receive 
information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers and through 
any media.31 However, the article’s next clause permits, but 
does not require, State Parties to limit speech when each part 
of a tripartite test is met.32 To be valid, speech restrictions 
must be (1) “provided by law” and (2) “necessary” to (3) achieve 
one of the treaty’s stated public interest objectives.33 These 
three prongs are often referred to as the “cumulative 
conditions of legality, necessity, and legitimacy.”34 
In 2011, the UN Human Rights Committee, the body of 
independent experts elected by ICCPR State Parties to 
monitor implementation of the treaty, recommended 
interpretations of this article that broadly protect speech 
rights.35 According to the Committee, a government must 
prove that any limitation on expression, including insulting 
speech, meets Article 19’s tripartite test.36 The remainder of 
 
 31. See ICCPR, supra note 24, at art. 19(2) (“Everyone shall have the 
right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice.”). 
 32. See id. art. 19(3).  
 33. See id. (listing the public interest objectives as the protection of the 
rights or reputations of others, national security, public order, public health 
or morals). 
 34. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (Apr. 6, 2018) 
[hereinafter UN SR 2018 Report]. 
 35. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter GC 34] (discussing the 
scope of freedom of expression and forbidding the adoption of overly broad 
speech restrictions). 
 36. See id. ¶ 27 (“It is for the State party to demonstrate the legal basis 
for any restrictions imposed on freedom of expression. If, with regard to a 
particular State party, the Committee has to consider whether a particular 
restriction is imposed by law, the State party should provide details of the 
law and of actions that fall within the scope of the law.”); see also id. ¶ 35 
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Part II.A elaborates on Article 19(3)’s tripartite test, highlights 
key interpretations by the UN human rights machinery, and 
explains how these three conditions promote broad protections 
for expression that are in line with the authors’ vision of 
protecting insulting speech. 
1. The “Legality” Condition: A Prohibition on Vague Content 
Bans 
The first prong of the tripartite test, the “provided by law” 
or “legality” condition, is generally understood to mean, inter 
alia, that laws limiting speech must be properly promulgated 
and not vague.37 The UN Human Rights Committee has 
emphasized that legal restrictions on speech must give 
individuals sufficient notice of the parameters of unacceptable 
expression.38 The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression 
(the “UN Special Rapporteur”), an independent expert 
appointed by the UN Human Rights Council to examine and 
report on this right, has also emphasized this point.39 In this 
 
When a State party invokes a legitimate ground for restriction of 
freedom of expression, it must demonstrate in specific and 
individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat, and the 
necessity and proportionality of the specific action taken, in 
particular by establishing a direct and immediate connection 
between the expression and the threat. 
 37. See infra notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
 38. See GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 25 
[A] norm, to be characterized as a ‘law’, must be formulated with 
sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her 
conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to the public. 
A law may not confer unfettered discretion for the restriction of 
freedom of expression on those charged with its execution. Laws 
must provide sufficient guidance to those charged with their 
execution to enable them to ascertain what sorts of expression are 
properly restricted and what sorts are not. 
Similarly, the United States government interprets the legality condition as 
encompassing “laws that are accessible, clear, and subject to judicial 
scrutiny,” OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIGEST OF 
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 226–27 (2011) [hereinafter 
U.S. OBSERVATIONS]. 
 39. See UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 7 (noting the legality 
condition means legal restrictions “must be adopted by regular legal 
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regard, he has criticized many national laws as unduly vague, 
including those that ban “obscene, gory or offensive material 
which is likely to cause fear and alarm to the general public” or 
the “glorification of terrorism.”40 In his report recommending 
that social media companies align their speech codes with 
ICCPR Article 19, the UN Special Rapporteur also criticized 
these private sector codes for incorporating a variety of vague 
bans on insulting or offensive speech.41 
As a former President of the American Civil Liberties 
Union discusses in her recent book on hate speech, prohibiting 
vague wording in speech bans plays an important role in 
limiting governmental regulation of offensive speech such as 
insults.42 In examining U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, she 
recounts that the Court has repeatedly struck down laws 
banning “insulting,” “abusive,” and other such language on 
 
processes and limit government discretion in a manner that distinguishes 
between lawful and unlawful expression with ‘sufficient precision’”). 
 40. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Rep. of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/71/373 (Sept. 6, 2016) 
[hereinafter UN SR 2016 Report]. The UN Human Rights Committee has 
also expressed concern about vague phrasing in counter-terrorism laws. See 
GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 46 (“Such offences as ‘encouragement of terrorism’ 
and ‘extremist activity’ as well as offences of ‘praising’, ‘glorifying’, or 
‘justifying’ terrorism, should be clearly defined to ensure that they do not 
lead to unnecessary or disproportionate interference with freedom of 
expression.”). The Special Rapporteur has also criticized Europe’s regional 
human rights law as failing to define hate speech with sufficient 
particularity. See UN SR 2016 Report, at ¶ 25. 
 41. See UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 26 
Company prohibitions of threatening or promoting terrorism, 
supporting or praising leaders of dangerous organizations and 
content that promotes terrorist acts or incites violence are, like 
counter-terrorism legislation, excessively vague. Company policies 
on hate, harassment and abuse also do not clearly indicate what 
constitutes an offence. Twitter’s prohibition of “behavior that 
incites fear about a protected group” and Facebook’s distinction 
between “direct attacks” on protected characteristics and merely 
“distasteful or offensive content” are subjective and unstable bases 
for content moderation. 
 42. See NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE 
SPEECH, NOT CENSORSHIP 69–72 (2018) (explaining the role of the vagueness 
standard in U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence). 
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grounds of ambiguity43 and assesses that bans on such speech 
are “insusceptible to precise, narrow definition.”44 When a ban 
on such offensive speech contains a narrow definition, it often 
fails for other reasons, such as viewpoint discrimination (laws 
that prohibit offensive speech towards one group necessarily 
discriminate against other groups).45 She cites a variety of 
attempts to define hateful or offensive speech in other 
countries that similarly fail a vagueness test.46 In sum, Article 
19(3)’s “legality” condition poses a significant international 
legal hurdle to speech regulation that seeks to ban insulting or 
offensive speech. 
2. The “Necessity” Condition: A Requirement to Use the Least 
Intrusive Means 
The second prong of ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite  
test— the “necessity” condition—is understood to require that a 
restriction on speech must reflect the least possible 
infringement on expression rights for achieving a public 
interest goal.47 In other words, if a speech restriction is not the 
 
 43. See id. at 71–72 (discussing, for example, a Supreme Court case that 
struck down a law banning speech that undermined the “dignity” of 
employees at foreign embassies as inherently subjective). 
 44. Id. at 72. 
 45. See id. at 74 (illustrating that under inclusion or selectivity can be 
just as lethal to the legality of a speech law as vagueness). Similarly, the UN 
Human Rights Committee has made clear that speech restrictions must 
comply with other provisions in the ICCPR, including those that ban 
discrimination. See GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 26 
Laws restricting the rights enumerated in article 19, paragraph 
2 . . . must not only comply with the strict requirements of article 
19, paragraph 3 of the Covenant but must also themselves be 
compatible with the provisions, aims and objectives of the 
Covenant. Laws must not violate the non-discrimination 
provisions of the Covenant. 
ICCPR Article 26 prohibits discrimination “on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status.” ICCPR, supra note 24, at art. 26. 
 46. See STROSSEN, supra note 42, at 75–80 (demonstrating by various 
examples from Canada and Europe that defining hate speech can be an 
intractable problem). 
 47. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
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least intrusive way for achieving a governmental purpose, then 
it cannot be “necessary” to achieve that purpose.48 The UN 
Human Rights Committee has interpreted this prong to 
require, inter alia, that the speech restriction must be “the 
least intrusive” means for achieving a legitimate public 
purpose.49 The UN Special Rapporteur has likewise stated that 
governments “must demonstrate that the restriction imposes 
the least burden on the exercise of the right and actually 
protects, or is likely to protect, the legitimate State interest at 
issue.”50 
To make its case that it has selected the “least intrusive” 
speech restriction,51 an ICCPR State Party must logically 
conduct a three-step inquiry: 
(1) Is there a way for the government to achieve the desired 
public interest goal without banning speech? 
(2) If the public purpose cannot be achieved without 
infringing on speech, what means are available to achieve 
the goal, and which one produces the “least intrusion” on 
speech interests? 
(3) Does the means selected actually help (or is it likely to 
help) achieve the public interest goal?52 
 
 48. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
 49. See GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 34 (stating that speech restrictions 
must be “the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve 
their protective function”). The United States government has also stated 
that it views the necessity condition as requiring that speech restrictions 
“must be the least restrictive means for protecting the governmental interest 
and are compatible with democratic principles.” U.S. OBSERVATIONS, supra 
note 38, at 227. In addition, in order to meet the “necessity” condition, the 
Committee has stated that restrictions must also meet the principle of 
proportionality, i.e., that restrictions must “be proportionate to the interest 
protected.” GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 34. 
 50. UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 7. 
 51. See GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 27 (stating that the government 
bears the burden of proving that each part of the ICCPR Article 19(3)’s 
tripartite test is met). The UN Special Rapporteur has also emphasized that 
governments “may not merely assert necessity but must demonstrate it, in 
the adoption of restrictive legislation and the restriction of specific 
expression.” UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 7. 
 52. See Aswad, supra note 30, at 47 (proposing a similar three-step 
inquiry in the context of assessing how social media platforms that engage in 
content moderation could ensure they respect the “necessity” test in ICCPR 
Article 19(3)). The UN Special Rapporteur recently cited favorably to my 
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If the government can achieve a legitimate public interest 
goal without banning speech or through a less restrictive 
means, or if the selected means does not help achieve the goal, 
then the government has not met its burden of selecting the 
“least intrusive” means of attaining its goal.53 Failure to select 
the “least intrusive” restriction results in the speech restriction 
failing the “necessity” condition.54 
At the UN, this trilogy of questions played out in heated 
and divisive discussions that spanned over a decade.55 During 
these discussions, diplomats contemplated whether it was 
appropriate to ban a spectrum of offensive speech 
encompassing religious intolerance/hate, blasphemy, and 
insults to religious feelings.56 In 2011, at the UN Human 
Rights Council, the international community adopted a 
consensus resolution that commemorated a variety of 
 
three-step inquiry in his report to the UN General Assembly, see David Kaye 
(Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 
¶ 52 U.N. DOC. A/74/486 (Oct. 9, 2019) [hereinafter UN SR 2019 Report] 
Evelyn Aswad identifies three steps that a company should take 
under the necessity framework: evaluate the tools it has available 
to protect a legitimate objective without interfering with the 
speech itself; identify the tool that least intrudes on speech; and 
assess whether and demonstrate that the measure it selects 
actually achieves its goals. 
These three steps—assessing if there are measures short of speech bans to 
achieve goals, determining the least intrusive speech infringement, and 
monitoring effectiveness of speech infringements—apply whether a 
government or company is seeking to demonstrate it acts consistently with 
ICCPR Article 19(3)’s necessity condition. 
 53. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 54. See UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 7 (“States must 
demonstrate that the restriction imposes the least burden on the exercise of the 
right and actually protects, or is likely to protect, the legitimate State interest at 
issue.”). 
 55. See Evelyn M. Aswad, To Ban or Not to Ban Blasphemous Videos, 44 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1313, 1323 (2013) (discussing the UN debates and 
discussions regarding censorship of blasphemous speech); see also Suzanne 
Nossel, ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UN SYSTEM, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. 15–16 (2012), https://perma.cc/P2TC-L3NC (PDF) (analyzing the debate 
regarding censorship of blasphemous speech in the international arena). 
 56. See supra note 55.  
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conclusions from these discussions.57 While it condemns 
various manifestations of religious intolerance, Resolution 
16/18 acknowledges that governments have a robust toolkit of 
options that should be deployed before resorting to speech 
bans.58 For example, the resolution urges governments to, 
among other things, speak out against intolerance, train 
government employees in effective outreach measures to 
groups that may be subject to intolerance, promote interfaith 
dialogues and educational initiatives to combat intolerance, 
and implement robustly and fairly administered laws that ban 
discriminatory acts or hate crimes.59 Moreover, the resolution 
noted that the freedoms of expression and religion were an 
important counter-weight to intolerance.60 In addition, this 
resolution limited its call for speech bans to instances in which 
the speech rises to incitement of imminent violence—a 
standard that is consistent with the U.S. First Amendment.61 
 
 57. Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18 
(Apr. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Council Res. 16/18]. 
 58. See, e.g., id. ¶ 5(h) (“Recognizing that the open, constructive and 
respectful debate of ideas, as well as interfaith and intercultural dialogue at 
the local, national and international levels, can play a positive role in 
combating religious hatred, incitement and violence[.]”). 
 59. Id. ¶¶ 4–6. 
 60. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 
 61. See Aswad, supra note 55, at 1325 (noting that even the main 
sponsor of the resolution recognized it was intended to be consistent with the 
First Amendment by citing to Ufuk Gokcen, The Reality of Freedom of 
Expression in the Muslim World, THE HILL (Oct. 19, 2012, 1:00 PM), 
https://perma.cc/QTW5-GFUX (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (reflecting an 
acknowledgment by a representative of the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation that Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18 uses “much of the 
United States First Amendment language” to promote “respect for and 
protection of the individual rights of all people”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review)); Jerome Socolovsky, Islamic Nations Relinquish 
Demand for Defamation Laws, VOA (Oct. 24, 2012, 10:05 PM), https://
perma.cc/7QHW-EPM6 (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (quoting a representative 
of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation as stating that that Resolution  
16/18 protects the rights of individual believers as opposed to religion itself 
and the framework “is compatible with the First Amendment”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). For a discussion of the First 
Amendment standard on incitement to imminent violence, see infra note 107 
and accompanying text. 
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This resolution represents an important recognition that 
governments have a variety of good governance measures at 
their disposal to tackle intolerant, offensive, and insulting 
speech before claiming a need to resort to speech bans. 
Governments that do not implement what is known as the 
“16/18 consensus toolkit”62 are hard pressed to justify their 
speech bans as “the least intrusive means” to achieving a 
legitimate purpose.63 Prohibitions against vague speech bans 
and discrimination against particular groups, when coupled 
with a requirement to use the least restrictive means to 
achieve a legitimate goal, generally leave governments with 
limited options for banning offensive speech. All in all, ICCPR 
Article 19(3)’s “necessity” condition poses another significant 
international legal hurdle to speech restrictions on insulting or 
offensive speech and further supports the vision for broad 
freedom of expression protections expressed in The Right to 
Insult in International Law.64 
3. The “Legitimacy” Condition: Speech Bans Must Be for Public 
Interest Goals 
The third prong of the tripartite test—the “legitimacy” 
condition—requires that any speech bans be imposed for one of 
the legitimate, enumerated rationales set forth in ICCPR 
Article 19(3): “[f]or respect of the rights or reputations of 
others; [f]or the protection of national security or of public 
order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.”65 Both the 
limited number of public interest rationales in the treaty text 
 
 62. Aswad, supra note 55, at 1328. 
 63. See id. at 1325–26 (noting that the use of the measures in 
Resolution 16/18 obviates the need for “broad bans on speech”). 
 64. For example, The Right to Insult in International Law advocates for 
speech protections “in line with the approach espoused by the U.S. Supreme 
Court under the First Amendment,” Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 51, 
and Council Res. 16/18 (coupled with relevant  interpretations by the UN’s 
independent experts, see, e.g., infra note 90) arguably does this by calling 
upon states to ban offensive and hateful speech in only one  
instance—incitement to imminent violence, which “reflects the U.S. 
constitutional standard” for a permissible restriction on speech. Aswad, 
supra note 55, at 1325. 
 65. ICCPR, supra note 24, at art. 19(3). 
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and the UN human rights machinery’s recommended 
interpretations serve to limit governmental discretion under 
this prong. The UN Human Rights Committee has warned 
that these grounds cannot be invoked as pretexts for limiting 
speech by emphasizing, for example, that “national security” 
cannot be improperly invoked to suppress information that 
does not actually harm national security.66 The Committee has 
also cautioned that speech restrictions that are justified on 
grounds of “public morals” are only valid if judged by the 
“universality of human rights and the principle of 
non-discrimination,”67 thereby seeking to constrain overly 
broad or inappropriate invocations of this rationale. Finally, 
the Committee has noted that the “rights . . . of others” 
comprises the rights in the ICCPR as well as other parts of 
international human rights law.68 
The UN Human Rights Committee has criticized many 
national laws that seek to ban insults of rulers, religion, and 
royalty. For example, in its 2011 General Comment, the 
Committee criticized penalties for criticism or insults of public 
officials and royalty: 
[T]he Committee has observed that in circumstances of 
public debate concerning public figures in the political 
domain and public institutions, the value placed by the 
Covenant upon uninhibited expression is particularly high. 
Thus, the mere fact that forms of expression are considered 
to be insulting to a public figure is not sufficient to justify 
the imposition of penalties . . . . [A]ll public figures, 
including those exercising the highest political authority 
such as heads of state and government, are legitimately 
subject to criticism and political opposition. Accordingly, 
the Committee expresses concern regarding laws on such 
matters as, lese majesty [insulting royalty], desacato 
[criticism of rulers], disrespect for authority, disrespect for 
 
 66. GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 30. 
 67. Id. at ¶ 32. The UN Special Rapporteur reaffirmed this caution in 
2018. UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 7. 
 68. GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 28. The UN Special Rapporteur 
reaffirmed this understanding in 2018. UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, 
at ¶ 7. 
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flags and symbols, defamation of the head of state and the 
protection of the honour of public officials . . . .69 
Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur has taken the view that 
laws protecting rulers or royalty from criticism are “manifestly 
inconsistent with freedom of expression.”70 
The UN Human Rights Committee has also criticized bans 
on blasphemy or other speech that insults religions or religious 
sensibilities by stating the following: 
Prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a religion or 
other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are 
incompatible with the Covenant, except in the specific 
circumstances envisaged in article 20, paragraph 2, of the 
Covenant [i.e., advocacy of incitement to harm]. . . . [I]t 
would be impermissible for any such laws to discriminate in 
favour of or against one or certain religions or belief 
systems, or their adherents over another, or religious 
believers over non-believers. Nor would it be permissible for 
such prohibitions to be used to prevent or punish criticism 
of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine and 
tenets of faith.71 
The UN Special Rapporteur has likewise opined that religions 
are not entitled to reputational protections under human 
rights law,72 as has the UN’s top expert on freedom of 
religion.73 
 
 69. GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 38 (footnotes omitted). 
 70. UN SR 2016 Report, supra note 40, at ¶ 33. 
 71. GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 48. 
 72. U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION 
ET AL., JOINT DECLARATION ON DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS, AND 
ANTI-TERRORISM AND ANTI-EXTREMISM LEGISLATION 2 (2008), https://perma.cc
/3C2L-7WWK (PDF) (noting the “defamation of religions” concept does not 
meet international standards for defamation, explaining that religions are 
not the subject of protection under these standards, and calling for an end to 
resolutions promoting this topic at the UN). 
 73. See Asma Jahangir (Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 
Belief) & Doudou Diène (Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of 
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance), Rep. 
for Human Rights Council Decision 1/107 on Incitement to Racial and 
Religious Hatred and the Promotion of Tolerance, ¶¶ 27, 36, 37, U.N. Doc.  
A/HRC/2/3 (Sept. 20, 2006) (opining that international law does not protect 
religions or beliefs from “criticism or ridicule”). 
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4. Impacts on ICCPR Article 20 and CERD Article 4 
The authors also express concern about the scope of 
ICCPR Article 20 and CERD Article 4.74 ICCPR Article 20 
requires bans on speech for “[a]ny advocacy of national, racial 
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence.”75 By its own terms, 
Article 20 has an intent requirement because “advocacy” 
necessitates an intention to promote a particular cause.76 
However, many other terms in this article have been the 
subject of significant debate.77 CERD Article 4 requires states, 
with “due regard” to other human rights such as freedom of 
 
 74. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 37–43. 
 75. ICCPR, supra note 24, at art. 20(2). 
 76. Aswad, supra note 55, at 1319. 
 77. The scope of this provision remains the subject of much debate 
among UN member states. For example, a 2006 report by the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights found that there was no consensus among 
nation states about the meaning of key terms in this article, including 
“incitement” and “hatred.” U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rep. on 
Incitement to Racial and Religious Hatred and the Promotion of Tolerance, 
¶¶ 3, 5, 81, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/6 (Sept. 20, 2006). The UN subsequently 
convened experts in four regional workshops to propose a way forward on the 
scope of Article 20, which culminated in the Rabat Plan of Action, but it was 
not endorsed by states. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rabat Plan of 
Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial or Religious Hatred 
that Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence, 
appendix, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4 (Jan. 11, 2013). Though the 
precise scope of Article 20 remains under debate, the application of the 
article is constrained by the fact that it is subject to Article 19’s tripartite 
test. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. Even the negotiations about 
this article were contentious. Aswad, supra note 55, at 1320–21. Eleanor 
Roosevelt, the head of the U.S. delegation, fought to keep Article 20 out of 
the ICCPR, arguing that: 
(1) [I]t was wholly out of place in a human rights treaty to 
empower and require states to ban speech; (2) such a provision 
would be abused by repressive regimes to justify problematic 
crackdowns on speech; (3) the wording of the provision was 
ambiguous, which was very dangerous and would compound 
governmental abuse; and (4) the principle of democracy was better 
served by allowing individuals to create disputes than by 
suppressing speech. 
Id. at 1321. Article 20 was eventually included in the ICCPR after a 
splintered vote. Id. 
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expression, to criminalize expressions of racial superiority and 
incitement to racial violence, among other forms of racial hate 
speech.78 
Though it would have been preferable from a freedom of 
expression viewpoint if ICCPR Article 20 and CERD Article 4 
had not been included in those treaties, the potential breadth 
of these articles is significantly limited because ICCPR Article 
19(3)’s tripartite test continues to apply to restrictions imposed 
under these two provisions.79 Indeed, it would be inconceivable 
to contemplate that either human rights treaty would 
empower governments to restrict speech even if the bans are 
vague, improperly promulgated, or unnecessary to achieve 
public interest purposes. 
The UN treaty bodies that monitor implementation of 
these two treaties have made clear that any prohibitions 
implemented pursuant to these articles must meet ICCPR 
Article 19’s tripartite test. For example, in General Comment 
34, the UN Human Rights Committee stated, “[A] limitation 
that is justified on the basis of article 20 must also comply with 
 
 78. CERD Article 4 provides: 
States Parties . . . undertake to adopt immediate and positive 
measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such 
discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles 
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention [which 
includes freedom of expression], inter alia: (a) Shall declare an 
offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on 
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as 
well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any 
race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and 
also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including 
the financing thereof . . . . 
CERD, supra note 25, at art. 4 (emphasis added). During the negotiations on 
this article, the United States expressed concerns, but eventually voted in 
favor of it on the basis that the “due regard” clause meant implementation of 
this article would be subject to protections for freedom of expression. See 
U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1318th mtg. at 152, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1318 
(Oct. 25, 1965) (“[The U.S. delegate] emphasized that her delegation had 
been able to support the text only on the understanding that . . . article IV 
did not impose on a State Party the obligation to take any action impairing 
the right to freedom of speech and freedom of association.”). 
 79. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
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article 19, paragraph 3.”80 Similarly, in its General 
Recommendation 35, the UN CERD Committee, which is the 
body of independent experts elected by State Parties to 
monitor implementation of the CERD, took the view that any 
prohibitions imposed under Article 4 must comply with Article 
19(3)’s conditions of legality and necessity.81 The UN CERD 
Committee also stated that application of Article 4 requires 
“due regard” for other human rights, particularly freedom of 
expression, which is “the most pertinent reference principle 
when calibrating the legitimacy of speech restrictions.”82 
 
 80. GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 50. The Committee goes on to say that in 
“every case in which the State restricts freedom of expression it is necessary 
to justify the prohibitions and their provisions in strict conformity with 
article 19.” Id. at ¶ 52. 
 81. See Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General 
Recommendation No. 35, ¶¶ 12, 19, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/35 (Sept. 26, 
2013) [hereinafter CERD GR 35] (“The application of criminal sanctions 
should be governed by principles of legality, proportionality and necessity.”). 
Presumably, the UN CERD Committee did not mention the condition of 
“legitimacy” because CERD Article 4 provides the legitimate public interest 
goal for restricting such speech. The UN CERD Committee also mentioned 
the principle of proportionality, which falls under the “necessity” condition. 
See supra note 49. The UN Special Rapporteur has also emphasized that any 
speech restrictions, including those imposed under ICCPR Article 20 or 
CERD Article 4, must comply with ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test. UN 
SR 2019 Report, supra note 52, at ¶¶ 13, 16; UN SR 2016 Report, supra note 
40, at ¶¶ 17, 25. 
 82. CERD GR 35, supra note 81, at ¶ 19. The authors note that CERD 
Article 4’s “due regard” clause has been interpreted by some to mean free 
expression principles must be complied with, others view it as meaning a 
balance must be struck between freedom of expression and the need to 
combat racism, and yet others believe the criminal bans on racist speech are 
mandatory regardless of other human rights. Clooney & Webb, supra note 
14, at 19 n.78. General Recommendation 35 seems to espouse the first 
interpretation given it emphasizes compliance with ICCPR Article 19’s 
tripartite test for laws that implement CERD Article 4 and even notes the 
“due regard” clause means assessing restrictions against this tripartite test. 
See CERD GR 35, supra note 81, at ¶ 12 (requiring consideration of the 
“principles of legality, proportionality and necessity”). It is unclear why The 
Right to Insult in International Law describes General Recommendation 35 
as not permitting consideration of freedom of expression rights in the 
application of CERD Article 4. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 19 
(stating that the UN CERD Committee refuses to give effect to give “due 
regard” to freedom of expression and mandates the criminalization of racist 
hate speech without regard to the legality or necessity conditions). This 
reading overlooks the UN CERD Committee’s explicit endorsement of giving 
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For the reasons discussed above, the applicability of 
ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test to any speech bans imposed 
under ICCPR Article 20 or CERD Article 4 significantly 
curtails the potential breadth of these articles as laws 
implemented under such provisions must not, inter alia, be 
vague and must constitute the least intrusive means to 
prevent harm.83 Though the applicability of this tripartite test 
to speech restrictions, including those imposed under ICCPR 
Article 20 and CERD Article 4, was not noted in The Right to 
Insult in International Law,84 it significantly furthers the 
authors’ vision for freedom of expression protections in 
international law. 
5. Reflections on the State of UN Human Rights Law and 
Insulting/Offensive Speech 
An analysis of ICCPR Article 19 reveals that its tripartite 
conditions of legality, necessity, and legitimacy are robust and 
 
due regard to freedom of expression in General Recommendation 35 and its 
call to apply the legality and necessity principles in assessing any criminal 
bans imposed under Article 4. CERD GR 35, supra note 81, at ¶¶ 12, 19. The 
authors also state that a 2011 UN Special Rapporteur report takes the view 
that CERD Article 4 does not require consideration of expression rights. 
Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 19 n.80. This report, however, cited to 
views of the UN CERD Committee that pre-dated its 2013 General 
Recommendation Number 35, which reflects the UN CERD Committee’s 
latest guidance on Article 4. See Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection 
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. A/66/290 
(Aug. 10, 2011) (stating the Committee’s view from 1993 that “the 
prohibition of the dissemination of all ideas based upon racial superiority or 
hatred is compatible with the right to freedom of opinion and expression” 
(quoting Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General 
Recommendation XV (42) on Article 4 of the Convention, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/48
/18 (Mar. 17, 1993))). 
 83. See supra notes 24–73 and accompanying text (discussing why such 
conditions make it difficult for hate speech laws to pass muster under ICCPR 
Article 19’s tripartite test). 
 84. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 15–19, 38–43 (discussing the 
criminalization of racially-motivated hate speech that appears to be required 
under the “plain language” of CERD Article 4, for example, but overlooking 
the fact that such criminalization must nevertheless satisfy the tripartite 
test). 
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constitute substantial legal hurdles for governments to 
surmount in order to justify any speech restrictions, including 
those imposed under ICCPR Article 20 and CERD Article 4.85 
Restrictions on insulting or otherwise offensive speech often 
fail because they are either vague or are not the least intrusive 
means to fulfill legitimate ends that can be achieved through 
good governance measures or a less onerous restriction.86 This 
is fully consistent with the authors’ view that “a myriad of 
non-legal tools” are available to combat offensive or insulting 
speech87 and that criminal bans on speech may be ineffective 
or even counterproductive.88 At times, restrictions on insulting 
speech will fail because they are imposed for an illegitimate 
reason, like seeking to protect rulers, religions, and royalty 
from insults.89 Application of this tripartite test has put the 
UN human rights machinery on a path towards only 
permitting bans on offensive speech where there is an intent to 
cause harm and a likelihood of near term harm.90 
While many states have laws that conflict with 
international law standards, that fact does not mean the 
 
 85. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 86. See, e.g., UN SR 2016 Report, supra note 40, at ¶¶ 14, 25, 33 (noting 
examples of counter-terrorism and hate speech laws that fail ICCPR Article 
19(3)’s vagueness test and highlighting that criminal penalties or inordinate 
civil penalties for defamation and libel are excessive, i.e., not necessary). 
 87. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 41. 
 88. See id. at 43 (citing the rise of hate speech and hate crimes in 
Europe despite “robust” criminal laws targeting such conduct). See also 
STROSSEN, supra note 42, at 133–82 (explaining why hate speech laws can be 
ineffective and even counterproductive while non-censorial methods can be 
more effective in combatting intolerance). 
 89. See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text (discussing the UN 
human rights machinery’s criticism of laws that forbid insults to rulers, 
religions, or royalty). 
 90. See CERD GR 35, supra note 81, at ¶ 16 (noting that in assessing 
incitement “the intention of the speaker, and the imminent risk or likelihood 
that the conduct desired or intended by the speaker will result from the 
speech in question” should be taken into account); Frank La Rue (Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 46, U.N. 
Doc. A/67/357 (Sept. 7, 2012) [hereinafter UN SR 2012 Report] (noting 
assessments of incitement should consider “real and imminent danger of 
violence resulting from the expression” and the speaker’s intention to incite). 
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international treaties or the UN human rights machinery fail 
to adequately protect insulting or otherwise offensive speech. 
Rather, it means that states are either violating their ICCPR 
obligations or (for those not party to the ICCPR) acting 
inconsistently with international standards.91 In sum, the 
violation of norms is a different problem from the authors’ 
alleged insufficiency of the norms and necessitates different 
solutions, as discussed in Part III. 
B. Why the International Law Regime Is Not Riddled with 
Contradictory Approaches to Insulting or Otherwise Offensive 
Speech 
In The Right to Insult in International Law, the authors 
take the position that the international machinery charged 
with interpreting freedom of expression standards has issued 
contradictory interpretations about the permissibility of bans 
on insulting or otherwise offensive speech.92 To the extent that 
the authors argue that the UN’s international human rights 
machinery and regional human rights mechanisms have 
issued inconsistent decisions on the scope of freedom of 
expression, I agree.93 Though this state of affairs is 
unfortunate, Part II.B.1 below explains why it does not render 
the UN human rights regime incoherent. Given that the UN 
and regional mechanisms interpret different treaties, differing 
approaches between the international and regional systems do 
not indicate fundamental flaws within the UN human rights 
system. To the extent that the authors argue that the various 
components within the UN machinery have issued inconsistent 
decisions about freedom of expression, Part II.B.2 below 
explains why the alleged contradictions in the UN’s guidance 
 
 91. For example, the Human Rights Committee has expressed concern 
over laws that harshly penalize speech that is critical of public officials and 
government institutions in countries such as the Dominican Republic and 
Zambia. GC 34, supra note 35, at 9–10. 
 92. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 44 (“[A] close study of 
international legal sources reveals inconsistent guidance on the question of 
when international law permits insults.”); id. at 46 (“[I]nternational law also 
diverges on the issue of denial laws, which protect against insults to the 
memories of deceased victims of crimes.”). 
 93. See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
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are best understood as an evolution in the UN machinery’s 
interpretations toward greater speech protections rather than 
as unworkable inconsistencies within the system. 
1. The UN Human Rights Machinery v. Regional Human 
Rights Mechanisms 
The authors properly observe that the UN’s international 
human rights machinery, on the one hand, and regional 
human rights bodies, on the other, approach the scope of 
freedom of expression in different ways.94 For example, the 
authors note that the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) has upheld the criminalization of atrocity denial 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
but that the UN Human Rights Committee views such laws as 
incompatible with the ICCPR.95 The authors also highlight 
that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that, 
under certain circumstances, criminalization of defamation is 
permissible under the Inter-American Convention on Human 
Rights whereas the UN Human Rights Committee has taken a 
 
 94. The authors focus on the European, African, and Inter-American 
human rights systems in their article, see, e.g., Clooney & Webb, supra note 
14, at 24–25 n.101 (citing cases from the human rights courts in those 
regions), but there are other sub-global systems as well. For example, the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s human rights system is based in part 
on the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam that limits expression by 
reference to Shariah norms. Org. of Islamic Cooperation, The Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Annex to Res. No. 49/19-P, art. 22 
(Aug. 5, 1990), https://perma.cc/QW9C-VXGN (PDF). The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also has a human rights declaration, 
which limits rights (including freedom of expression) in ways that are 
inconsistent with the UN human rights regime. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of State, ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights (Nov. 20, 2012), https://
perma.cc/7GYA-EYS4 (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) (“While part of the ASEAN 
Declaration adopted November 18 tracks the [Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights], we are deeply concerned that many of the ASEAN 
Declaration’s principles and articles could weaken and erode universal 
human rights and fundamental freedoms as contained in the UDHR.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 95. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 46 (comparing the views of 
the Human Rights Committee’s GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 49, with the 
ECtHR’s decision in Witzsch v. Germany, App. No. 7485/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., 
(Dec. 13, 2005), https://perma.cc/M9BR-XGSQ (PDF)). 
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strong stand against it when interpreting the ICCPR.96 In 
addition, the authors spotlight the European Court’s use of a 
“guillotine” provision to deny highly offensive speech any 
protection under the ECHR whereas the UN Human Rights 
Committee gives all speech the protection of ICCPR Article 
19’s tripartite test.97 
Though there can be no doubt that the UN machinery and 
regional mechanisms have taken differing approaches 
concerning the scope of freedom of expression, such differences 
do not render the UN treaties or their associated 
interpretations by UN bodies inconsistent or incoherent. The 
international human rights law regime for freedom of 
expression is comprised of UN treaties (such as the ICCPR) 
that apply to State Parties around the world.98 The UN’s 
international human rights treaties create committees of 
independent experts from around the world to monitor treaty 
 
 96. See id. at 45–46 (“[T]he U.N. has spoken out strongly against 
criminal defamation . . . . [T]he Inter-American Court has held that criminal 
defamation is legitimate where it ‘meets the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality’ . . . .” (quoting Mémoli v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter‑Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
265, ¶ 126 (Aug. 22, 2013))). 
 97. Id. at 22. There are many other differences between the 
interpretations of the UN human rights machinery and the European Court 
of Human Rights. For example, the UN Human Rights Committee and UN 
Special Rapporteur have consistently spoken out against bans on blasphemy. 
See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. The European Court of 
Human Rights, on the contrary, has consistently upheld blasphemy bans 
when interpreting the ECHR. See, e.g., Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 
295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (upholding prior restraint on a film that 
could offend the religious sensibilities of Christians); E.S. v Austria, App. 
38450/12, Eur. Ct. H.R., (Oct. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/5JDN-FN78 (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2019) (upholding conviction for disparaging Islamic religious 
doctrines) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In addition, 
the European Court of Human Rights has created a doctrine called the 
“margin of appreciation,” in which it defers to the judgment of governments, 
particularly when there are different interpretations of treaty rights among 
European nations. PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS 946–48 (2012). The UN Human Rights Committee, on the other 
hand, has made clear that it does not apply a margin of appreciation to 
freedom of expression issues. GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 36. 
 98. See ICCPR, supra note 24, at art. 48(1) (providing that any member 
of the United Nations and certain other states can become a party to the 
ICCPR).  
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implementation and recommend interpretations of their 
texts.99 The UN Human Rights Council also periodically selects 
an independent expert (the Special Rapporteur) to monitor, 
report, and provide recommendations on global freedom of 
expression issues.100 The various regional systems have their 
own treaties and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, 
but they only apply within their respective areas of the 
world.101 The regional human rights courts are not empowered 
to interpret the ICCPR; the UN system is not empowered to 
interpret the regional treaties. Just because regional courts 
and mechanisms assess their respective treaties to have a 
narrower scope for freedom of expression than the ICCPR102 
does not mean that the UN system—its treaties and the 
interpretations issued by its machinery—is somehow rendered 
inconsistent. It simply means that the international and 
regional systems provide different levels of protection for 
freedom of expression. 
This is not to say that it is an advisable state of affairs for 
the international and regional systems to take inconsistent 
views on the scope of freedom of expression. For those of us 
who favor broad protections for freedom of expression, it is 
disheartening that regional systems provide fewer speech 
protections and it would be preferable if they would adopt the 
UN machinery’s approaches. This state of affairs is also 
unfortunate because countries often cite to the jurisprudence 
 
 99. See, e.g., id. art. 28(1) (“There shall be established a Human Rights 
Committee . . . . It shall consist of eighteen members and shall carry out the 
functions hereinafter provided.”); CERD, supra note 25, at art. 8(1) (“There 
shall be established a Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination . . . consisting of eighteen experts of high moral 
standing . . . .”). 
 100. See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right 
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER 
FOR HUM. RTS., https://perma.cc/DD4N-VUXG (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) 
(explaining the establishment of the Special Rapporteur’s mandate in 1993 
and the periodic extensions thereof) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 101. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. NO. 005, 
art. 59 (establishing that only members of the Council of Europe can become 
state parties to the Convention).  
 102. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
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of their regional machinery to justify their actions when they 
are accused of violating UN human rights treaties. For 
example, when the UN Special Rapporteur wrote to Germany 
to express a host of serious concerns with its Network 
Enforcement Act,103 Germany defended its law based on 
European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence.104 Though 
invocation of a regional treaty cannot justify a country’s 
violation of its international treaty obligations,105 such 
attempts may prove dangerous over time as they could 
eventually erode UN protections for speech when ICCPR State 
Parties invoke regional norms and worldviews to advocate for 
lower speech protection standards at the international level.  
2. Unworkable Inconsistencies Within the UN’s Human Rights 
Machinery or an Evolution of Interpretative Guidance? 
The authors also take the position that the UN human 
rights machinery’s guidance on the scope of protection for 
freedom of expression is internally inconsistent. This Part 
posits that such differences would be better characterized as 
an evolution in the thinking of these bodies, with more recent 
interpretations reflecting a progression towards broader 
protections for speech. Such an evolution in legal 
interpretation happens as well within domestic court systems. 
For example, U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence once upheld 
bans on speech that had a “bad tendency” to cause harm.106 
 
 103. Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement 
Act], Sept. 1, 2017, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 3352 (Ger.), 
https://perma.cc/V46W-J3A4 (PDF). 
 104. See Letter from Federal Government of Germany, Answers to the 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom 
of Opinion and Expression in Regard to the Act to Improve Enforcement of 
the Law in Social Networks (Network Enforcement Act) 3 (June 1, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/95YG-MKAK (PDF) (“Likewise, the European Court of 
Human Rights in its case-law has made abundantly clear that hate speech is 
intolerable in a democratic society.”). 
 105. As noted by the UN Special Rapporteur, “[r]egional human rights 
norms cannot, in any event, be invoked to justify departure from 
international human rights protections.” UN SR 2019 Report, supra note 52, 
at ¶ 26. 
 106. See ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A 
BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 23–38, 157–167 (2007) (noting that this 
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Over time, however, it shifted towards a more rigorous 
standard that requires the speaker’s intent to cause lawless 
action that is both likely and imminent.107 This Part analyzes 
the authors’ main examples of the UN machinery’s alleged 
inconsistencies and proposes that these decisions should 
instead be viewed as an evolution in the thinking of these 
bodies, which appear to be on a trajectory towards greater 
protections for speech. 
As evidence of an inconsistency within the UN human 
rights machinery, the authors note the UN CERD Committee’s 
differing views as to what constitutes “incitement.”108 In 
particular, the authors highlight that the UN CERD 
Committee’s General Recommendation 35 states that 
incitement should include the “imminent risk or likelihood 
that the conduct desired or intended by the speaker will result 
from the speech . . . .”109 The authors then contrast this 
standard with individual complaints decisions issued by the 
UN CERD Committee and UN Human Rights Committee.110 
However, the cited individual complaints decisions were all 
 
view prevailed in early twentieth-century cases such as Patterson v. 
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907)). 
 107. See id. at 157–67 (discussing the ruling in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444 (1969)). 
 108. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 36 (comparing the CERD 
Committee’s General Recommendation 35 with its decisions in individual 
complaints as well as the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 34). 
 109. Id. (quoting CERD GR 35, supra note 81, at ¶ 16). 
 110. See id. (“[I]n many cases both the Human Rights Committee and the 
CERD Committee have sanctioned criminal convictions for speech without 
explicitly taking into account whether a prohibited impact was foreseen, 
likely or imminent.”). The UN’s Human Rights Committee and CERD 
Committee can hear individual complaints against States Parties for treaty 
violations if those governments have consented to subject themselves to such 
complaints. See Human Rights Treaty Bodies—Individual Communications, 
OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., https://perma.cc/4YZY-
UNWQ (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (“Anyone can lodge a complaint with a 
Committee against a State that satisfies these two conditions (being a party 
to the treaty and having accepted the Committee’s competence to examine 
individual complaints), claiming that his or her rights under the relevant 
treaty have been violated.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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decided before CERD General Recommendation 35 was issued 
in 2013.111 
This General Recommendation should be viewed as an 
evolution in the Committee’s thinking on bans on racist hate 
speech rather than an inconsistency in its jurisprudence. 
Before issuing formal recommended interpretations of treaties, 
UN treaty committee members engage in a consultation 
process that canvases the views of State Parties and civil 
society organizations.112 After such consultations, committees 
hold intensive deliberations that can take years before issuing 
the committee’s ultimate views.113 Such a period of intensive 
deliberation and reflection can easily mark a turning point and 
evolution in the UN CERD Committee’s thinking on Article 4, 
just as seminal cases decided over a prolonged period can 
spark transitions in a domestic court’s jurisprudence.114 
The authors also express concern about potential 
contradictions between the UN Human Rights Committee and 
the UN CERD Committee with respect to the criminalization 
 
 111. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 36 n.165 (citing UN Human 
Rights Committee decisions from 1996, 2000, and 2009 as well as a UN 
CERD Committee decision from 2005). 
 112. See, e.g., Michael O’Flaherty, Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human 
Rights Committee’s General Comment 34, 12 HUM RTS. L. REV. 627, 650 
(2012) (discussing submissions by States Parties and other stakeholders 
suggesting changes to a draft of General Comment 34). 
 113. See id. at 645 (describing the process by which the UN Human 
Rights Committee developed General Comment 34). 
 114. On the topic of inconsistencies on “incitement” by the UN 
machinery, the authors also state that a draft of the UN Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment 34 contained language that stated Article 20 
required advocacy that was “likely to trigger imminent acts,” but that such 
guidance was not included in the final version of the General Comment. 
Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 36. The lead drafter on the UN Human 
Rights Committee for this 2011 General Comment has explained that “he 
had not been mandated to develop general comment guidance on [Article 20]” 
and was only able to reach consensus on text that explained the relationship 
between Articles 19 and 20. O’Flaherty, supra note 112, at 647–49. Thus, 
removal of the draft language interpreting Article 20 may have reflected a 
need to stay within the mandate to develop guidance on Article 19 rather 
than a definitive, substantive stance by the UN Human Rights Committee on 
the drafter’s proposed language interpreting Article 20. 
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of defamation.115 The authors note that in 2011 the UN Human 
Rights Committee had “spoken out strongly against criminal 
defamation” in both an individual complaints decision and its 
General Comment 34,116 but cite to a 2003 UN CERD 
Committee individual complaints decision, in which it upheld a 
criminal defamation conviction in Denmark, as evidence of 
being out of step with its sister committee.117 This decision was 
issued well before the UN CERD Committee’s 2013 General 
Recommendation 35, which sets forth how the Committee will 
analyze the criminalization of such speech applying the 
conditions of legality and necessity in future cases.118 Might 
 
 115. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 44–45. 
 116. Id. at 45 n.203, 204. The article also notes that the UN Special 
Rapporteur “consistently advocates the decriminalization of 
defamation. . . . [but] has, on occasion, implicitly regarded criminal 
defamation laws as acceptable.” Id. at 45 n.205. The article cites as an 
example a 2016 letter of the UN Special Rapporteur to the Netherlands 
about his concern and criticism of the country’s lese-majeste [insulting 
royalty] laws. Id. It is unclear why the article views this letter as an implicit 
approval of criminal defamation laws. In this letter, the Special Rapporteur 
condemns such laws as not proportional (i.e., they fail ICCPR Article 19’s 
tripartite test) and cites to the UN Human Rights Committee’s criticisms of 
criminal defamation in General Comment 34. Letter from David Kaye, U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom 
of Opinion and Expression, to Roderick van Schreven, Permanent 
Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations, 3–4 (Oct. 14, 
2016), https://perma.cc/4ZQZ-VKNA (PDF). This footnote also cites to an 
opinion by Europe’s Commission for Democracy through Law (also known as 
the Venice Commission). Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 45 n.205. 
However, the Venice Commission is not part of the UN’s machinery (instead 
being part of Europe’s regional human rights system) and thus not relevant 
to the argument that the guidance issued by the UN machinery is internally 
inconsistent. Moreover, this Venice Commission decision re-states General 
Comment 34’s criticism of criminal defamation laws. See Venice Comm’n, 
Opinion on Articles 216, 299, 301 and 314 of the Penal Code of Turkey, 
Opinion No. 831/2015, ¶ 56 (Mar. 15, 2016), https://perma.cc/3GS5-DBYS 
(PDF) (“Under Article 19 ICCPR, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee has also urged that ‘States parties should consider the 
decriminalization of defamation . . . and imprisonment is never an 
appropriate penalty.” (quoting GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 47)). 
 117. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 45 n.206. 
 118. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. Moreover, the 2003 
CERD individual complaints decision also pre-dates the UN Human Rights 
Committee’s General Comment 34, which was issued in 2011. GC 34, supra 
note 35. Often the UN CERD Committee will consider the views of its sister 
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not this chronological sequencing of events be better viewed as 
an evolution in the guidance of the UN bodies towards greater 
protections for speech rather than an unworkable 
inconsistency? 
The authors also argue that the UN Human Rights 
Committee and the UN CERD Committee have at times 
suggested that State Parties must satisfy an intent 
requirement before banning incitement to discrimination, 
hostility, or violence and at other times seem to have approved 
of such bans without insisting on such a showing.119 For 
example, the authors highlight the UN CERD Committee’s 
General Recommendation 35, which states that any 
convictions for incitement should satisfy an intent standard.120 
The article then cites to a variety of UN Human Rights 
Committee and UN CERD Committee individual complaints 
decisions that “have allowed convictions for hate speech to 
stand even where there was no analysis of intent . . . .”121 All of 
the individual complaints decisions cited to for this proposition 
pre-date the UN Human Rights Committee’s General 
Comment 34 (from 2011) and the UN CERD Committee’s 
 
committee, the UN Human Rights Committee, in its work. See, e.g., CERD 
GR 35, supra note 81, at ¶¶ 4, 6 (highlighting the UN Human Rights 
Committee General Comment 34 in noting its use of sister committees’ 
interpretations). The article also cites to UN CERD Committee individual 
complaints decisions from April 15, 2005 and April 4, 2013. Clooney & Webb, 
supra note 14, at 45 n.208. Both decisions pre-dated the UN CERD 
Committee’s General Recommendation 35, which was issued in September 
2013. 
 119. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 33 (“Nevertheless, both the 
CERD Committee and the Human Rights Committee have allowed 
convictions for hate speech to stand even where there was no analysis of 
intent, including in recent years.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 120. See id. 
[I]n its 2013 General Recommendation on racial hate speech the 
CERD Committee published new guidance that State parties 
should recognize as “important elements” of any offence of 
incitement “the intention of the speaker and the imminent risk or 
likelihood that the conduct desired or intended by the speaker will 
result from the speech in question.” 
 121. Id. 
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General Recommendation 35 (from 2013).122 Again, when one 
examines the chronology of the cited decisions and the overall 
trajectory towards greater protections for freedom of 
expression, it seems more appropriate to view this sequencing 
as an evolution in the UN machinery’s thinking rather than as 
an unworkable or problematic inconsistency. 
3. Reflections on Alleged Inconsistencies in UN Freedom of 
Expression Interpretations 
An analysis of the alleged inconsistencies in the 
international law regime results in two main conclusions. 
First, although the UN’s international human rights regime 
and the various regional human rights regimes approach 
freedom of expression differently, that fact does not somehow 
render the UN regime incoherent or inconsistent.123 It simply 
means that the UN system provides more protections for 
speech than the regional systems.124 This state of affairs risks 
eroding UN standards over time when governments 
improperly invoke their regional standards for freedom of 
expression as an excuse for not implementing their 
international human rights obligations or assert that regional 
interpretations can define the scope of international human 
rights obligations.125 Unfortunately, collapsing the UN and 
regional systems to conclude that the “international” system is 
incoherent only strengthens the potential for such erosion 
because it incentivizes countries that oppose UN standards to 
counter them by creating and invoking “competing” regional 
norms. 
Second, based on the specific arguments made in The 
Right to Insult in International Law, it appears that the 
alleged inconsistencies within the UN machinery are more 
likely evolutions in the thinking of the UN mechanisms rather 
 
 122. See id. at 33 nn.148–49 (citing individual complaint decisions from 
1996, 2003, 2005, and 2009). 
 123. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 124. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra notes 104–105 and accompanying text. 
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than problems that render their interpretations incoherent.126 
Though the article usually contrasted earlier decisions of the 
UN’s oversight machinery with its most recent decisions and 
commentary to find inconsistencies, the sequencing of the cited 
decisions and interpretations reflect an evolution towards 
greater speech protections. The United States domestic legal 
system underwent a similar evolution, with the Supreme 
Court gradually expanding protections for speech over time. 
The UN’s trajectory towards greater recognition of speech 
protections should be reinforced rather than dismissed as 
unworkable inconsistencies. 
III. Assessment of Proposals to Promote Free Expression at the 
International Level 
The authors make four recommendations for promoting 
broad protections for insulting or offensive speech at the 
international level, including by updating the existing 
international regime or seeking particular interpretations of 
existing provisions.127 The authors conclude by calling on 
 
 126. The point of this analysis is not to argue that the UN machinery’s 
interpretations are perfect or always consistent, but rather to address the 
particular claims about systemic inconsistences that are made in The Right 
to Insult in International Law, which (as discussed in Part I) has resulted in 
the article being cited for the proposition that the UN human rights regime 
for freedom of expression may be problematic in the context of content 
moderation by global platforms. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 127.  See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 53–54 (proposing that CERD 
Article 4 be deleted or “excluded through reservations,” that “states should 
enter reservations to ICCPR Article 20,” that outdated concepts not be 
utilized “to justify the criminalization of insults,” and that ECHR Article 17 
and ICCPR Article 5 should be made inapplicable to “freedom of expression 
cases”). The authors also set forth recommendations for action at the 
domestic level, including: the recognition in local laws of a “right to insult” 
unless the expression intends to create violence or other crimes and is likely 
to do so; the abolition of criminal laws on insulting rulers, religion, and 
royalty as well as bans on denials of historic atrocities; and an end to 
misusing counter-terrorism or public order laws to ban insulting speech. Id. 
at 52–53. I generally agree with the substance of these recommendations. 
However, as previously discussed in Part II, these recommendations already 
align with existing UN treaty texts and reasonable interpretations of those 
treaties by the UN’s human rights machinery. See supra notes 66–84 and 
accompanying text. The reason countries have problematic laws that ban 
insulting rulers, religion, or royalty is not because international law 
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private platforms to be guided by international human rights 
law, as amended by their recommendations, in curating online 
content.128 This Part evaluates each proposal, determines that 
the international regime is much closer to the authors’ vision 
than they had assessed, and proposes more impactful ways of 
achieving the authors’ important goal of promoting broad 
speech protections at the international level. 
A. CERD Article 4 
The authors’ first recommendation is that “CERD Article 4 
should be deleted by the agreement of States Parties or 
excluded through reservations.”129 Although the CERD does 
provide an amendment procedure,130 given the alarming global 
 
standards are lacking but because the countries lack the political will to 
change their laws and nations have not afforded effective enforcement 
mechanisms for international human rights treaties. See Alberto Cerda 
Silva, Protecting Free Speech in the Digital Age: Q&A with UN Special 
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, FORD FOUNDATION (Oct. 11, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/9LCJ-QXE9 (last visited Jan. 7, 2020)   
Around the world, governments are stretching the meaning of 
what’s permitted [under ICCPR Article 19]: They define national 
security in broad, vague ways that make it difficult for individuals 
to know what speech or opinions are allowed and what may be 
subject to penalty, they apply restrictions that go well beyond 
what is necessary to address specific threats, and they fail to 
justify their restrictions.  
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). It is therefore important, 
as I argue later in this Article, for human rights advocacy to invoke and 
promote ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test and the most recent guidance from 
the UN’s human rights machinery in order to protect freedom of expression 
at the international level. See infra Part III.E. 
 128. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 54 (advocating for technology 
companies to use international human rights law as well as the authors’ 
suggestions as guides for determining whether online content should be 
removed). 
 129. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 53. 
 130. The CERD requires that a State Party submit any request for 
revision of the treaty to the UN Secretary General and that the UN General 
Assembly decide how to proceed. See CERD, supra note 25, at art. 23 
(1) A request for the revision of this Convention may be made at 
any time by any State Party by means of a notification in writing 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. (2) The 
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trend toward greater governmental repression of speech,131 it 
is not likely that opening up a negotiation among states on 
CERD Article 4 would result in its deletion rather than further 
restrictions on speech, especially because governments tend to 
fight for text that justifies their existing domestic practices in 
multilateral human rights fora.132 For example, for many 
years, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation—which 
represents fifty-seven nations—led an effort at the UN to 
develop a protocol to the CERD that would have further 
restricted speech by banning the “defamation of religions,” an 
umbrella concept that includes blasphemy, insults to religions, 
and other speech that offends religious sensibilities.133 A 
 
General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the 
steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such a request. 
In a prior attempt to amend the CERD in the early 1990s, the General 
Assembly approved the proposed amendment subject to a proviso that it 
would not go into force until two-thirds of the State Parties had endorsed it, 
which has not yet occurred. See Amendment to Article 8 of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1, 
United Nations Treaty Collection (Jan. 15, 1992), https://perma.cc/7LL4-
939H (PDF) (documenting the status of the proposed amendment). 
 131. As the authors noted, “the tide around the world is turning against 
free speech . . . .” Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 55. See also Democracy 
in Retreat: Freedom in the World 2019, 5 FREEDOM HOUSE, https://perma.cc
/PRA3-JVRE (last visited Dec. 29, 2019) (finding that “data show freedom of 
expression declining each year over the past [thirteen] years, with sharper 
drops since 2012”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For an 
overview of the growing European restrictions on speech, see David Kaye, 
How Europe’s New Internet Laws Threaten Freedom of Expression: Recent 
Regulations Risk Censoring Legitimate Content, FOREIGN AFF. (Dec. 18, 
2017), https://perma.cc/SU9Y-8TE5 (last visited Dec. 29, 2019) (explaining 
European countries’ attempts to regulate online speech and the impact that 
has on private internet companies and individuals) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). See also Dangerously Disproportionate: 
The Ever-Expanding National Security State in Europe, AMNESTY INT’L (Jan. 
17, 2017), https://perma.cc/GAV5-6QPQ (last visited Mar. 18, 2020) 
(reporting on European governments’ responses to national security threats 
and the adverse effect of those responses on a variety of rights including 
freedom of expression) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 132. See infra notes 133–134 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Robert C. Blitt, Defamation of Religion: Rumors of Its Death Are 
Greatly Exaggerated, 62 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 347, 365–66 (2011) 
(discussing how a committee was formed at the UN to develop a protocol to 
the CERD that would have criminalized blasphemy). Freedom House and 
members of civil society expressed alarm at the attempt by states at the UN 
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sustained diplomatic effort by many countries, including the 
United States, and civil society avoided that outcome, aligned 
the discussions with international human rights law, and 
shifted the focus to measures that would combat religious 
intolerance and negative stereotyping without banning 
speech.134 Amending existing human rights treaties during a 
time of rising governmental restrictions on speech would not 
bode well for achieving deletion of CERD Article 4 or the larger 
goal of promoting the broadest possible speech protections. 
Instead, at any negotiation to amend the CERD, governments 
would more likely seek to commemorate text that justifies 
their problematic laws, including those that the authors 
highlight in their survey of worldwide bans on insults against 
rulers, religion, and royalty.135 
The authors’ recommendation provides in the alternative 
that nations should take a reservation to CERD Article 4.136 
 
to amend the CERD to criminalize the “defamation of religions.” See 
FREEDOM HOUSE, FACT SHEET: DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS 1–2 (2009), https://
perma.cc/3GDT-HQY4 (PDF) (explaining why “the concept of ‘defamation of 
religions’” is problematic); L. Bennett Graham, No to an International 
Blasphemy Law, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2010, 11:30 EDT), https://perma.cc
/AQ37-4RRE (last visited Dec. 29, 2019) (arguing against the adoption of an 
international treaty banning blasphemy on the grounds that the human 
rights regime is intended to protect human beings and not ideas) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 134. See Nossel, supra note 55, at 15–16 (detailing the role of the United 
States in dissuading the passage of a defamation of religion protocol at the 
UN). The risk of re-igniting the process to develop a protocol to the CERD to 
criminalize the “defamation of religions” remains and freedom of expression 
advocates have been vigilant in fighting against such attempts to re-open 
speech restrictions in the CERD. See UN HRC: Initiative to Criminalise “Acts 
of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature” Must Adhere to Freedom of Expression 
Standards, ARTICLE 19 (Mar. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/CD2X-TJ26 (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2019) (urging states at the Human Rights Council to “to 
guard against any new binding instrument that may be used as a vehicle to 
undermine protections for freedom of expression and equality”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 135. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 3–13 (reviewing and 
categorizing various countries’ laws on “insulting rulers,” “insulting religion,” 
and “insulting royalty”). 
 136. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 53 (“CERD Article 4 should 
be deleted by the agreement of States Parties or excluded through 
reservations”). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a 
reservation as “a unilateral statement . . . made by a State, when signing, 
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But it is questionable how helpful this strategy would be in 
promoting broad international legal protections for freedom of 
expression. Although the CERD has a procedure for lodging 
reservations, those reservations must be taken at the time 
when a state becomes a party to a treaty.137 Because the CERD 
already has 182 State Parties,138 none of those existing State 
Parties are able to take a reservation. As a result, only a dozen 
or so states could even take the recommended reservation to 
Article 4 upon joining the treaty.139 
While new State Parties taking a reservation to CERD 
Article 4 would have the benefit of meaning that they refuse to 
take on a treaty obligation to ban speech, it is unclear how 
helpful a series of such reservations would be with respect to 
the state of international law on mandatory racist hate speech 
bans. Reservations that decry or commemorate the broadness 
of CERD Article 4 would have the (unintended) consequence of 
bolstering existing State Parties claims that they have 
expansive rights to ban speech under this provision.140 It may 
 
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to 
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their 
application to that State.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 
2(1)(d), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
 137. See CERD, supra note 25, at art. 20(1) (“The Secretary-General of 
the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all States which are or may 
become Parties to this Convention reservations made by States at the time of 
ratification or accession.”) (emphasis added). This timing requirement is 
consistent with the definition of a “reservation” in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties. See VCLT, supra note 136, at art. 2(1)(d) (stating that a 
reservation is made at the time when a State is “signing, ratifying, accepting, 
approving, or acceding to a treaty”). 
 138. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://perma.cc/Y4CM-L67X (last visited Dec. 29, 2019) (listing the 
countries that are state parties to the CERD) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 139. The UN member states that have not yet become State Parties to 
the CERD include Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, North Korea, Kiribati, 
Malaysia, Micronesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, South Sudan, 
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. See International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 138 (indexing the countries that 
have become state parties to the CERD).   
 140. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 19 n. 78 (noting that one of 
the three main ways of interpreting CERD Article 4 is “that the protection of 
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therefore be preferable for non-parties to the CERD (if they 
have the political will to do so) to issue an “understanding”141 
that recognizes that Article 4 is subject to ICCPR Article 19’s 
tripartite test, rather than a reservation, when joining the 
CERD. This would help solidify and give impetus to a 
narrower view of the scope of CERD Article 4, and thus better 
achieve the authors’ goal because understandings “can be 
important when interpreting the meaning of a treaty since, if 
other states do not object or offer alternative ones, the 
understandings might be viewed as evidence of the parties’ 
interpretation of the treaty.”142 
The authors’ recommendation on CERD Article 4 
concludes by asserting that its breadth “cannot be cured by 
interpretation.”143 As analyzed in Part II, rigorous application 
of ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test to CERD Article 4 
significantly narrows the potential breadth of this article 
because governments must prove, inter alia, that any speech 
bans are not vague and constitute the least intrusive means to 
fight racism, which are both significant hurdles that narrow 
appropriate invocations of this article to justify speech bans.144 
The UN CERD Committee’s General Recommendation 35 
similarly provides that imposition of hate speech bans under 
CERD Article 4 must meet the conditions of legality, necessity, 
 
human rights may not be invoked to avoid enacting legislation to give effect to” 
this ban on racist hate speech by citing to Karl Josef Partsch, Racial Speech 
and Human Rights: Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, in STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 24–25 (Sandra Coliver et 
al. eds., 1992)).  
 141. At the time when a state joins a treaty it can issue an 
“understanding,” which “is an interpretative statement that clarifies or 
elaborates upon a treaty provision without altering it.” SEAN MURPHY, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (West Acad. 2d ed. 2018). 
Understandings are therefore different from “reservations,” which allow 
states to exclude or modify treaty obligations. See VCLT, supra note 136, at 
art. 2(1)(d), (defining a “reservation” as a unilateral statement made by a 
country that “purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain 
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State”). 
 142. MURPHY, supra note 141, at 94. 
 143. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 54. 
 144. See supra notes 24–71 and accompanying text. 
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and proportionality.145 In addition, General Recommendation 
35 views incitement as limited to cases in which there is 
sufficient intent and an imminent risk or likelihood of harm, 
which further gives momentum to the authors’ goal of limiting 
the potential breadth of this article.146 Rather than taking the 
position that this article cannot be narrowed by interpretation 
or promoting reservations that commemorate an undesirable 
breadth for this article, why not steal victory (broad speech 
protections) from the jaws of potential defeat (CERD Article 4) 
by emphasizing and promoting several key interpretations of 
the UN CERD Committee in human rights advocacy? 
B. ICCPR Article 20 
The authors’ second recommendation is for states to “enter 
reservations to ICCPR Article 20 to prohibit speech only where 
it intentionally incites violence or a criminal offence that is 
likely to follow imminently (or is otherwise concretely 
identified) as the result of the speech.”147 Because there are 
already 173 State Parties to the ICCPR148 and reservations 
cannot be lodged after a state joins a treaty, this 
recommendation would only apply to those few states that are 
not already parties to the treaty.149 
This recommendation triggers some of the same concerns 
noted above with respect to the proposal to promote 
reservations to CERD Article 4. First, it is unclear that ICCPR 
non-parties with poor records on human rights (including with 
respect to freedom of expression) will join the ICCPR with the 
 
  145. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 147. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 54. 
 148. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://perma.cc/CE2N-7J2T (last visited Dec. 
29, 2019) (listing the countries that are signatories and state parties to the 
ICCPR) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 149. China, Cuba, Comoros, Nauru, Palau, and Saint Lucia have signed, 
but not ratified the ICCPR. See id. (indexing the countries that are party to 
the ICCPR). Additional UN member states that are not State Parties to the 
ICCPR include Bhutan, Brunei, Kiribati, Malaysia, Micronesia, Myanmar, 
Oman, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, 
South Sudan, Tuvalu, and the United Arab Emirates. Id. 
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proposed reservation. Second, if future parties to the ICCPR 
have the political will to speak out on this issue, it would be 
more strategic to encourage them to join with 
“understandings” that commemorate the substance of the 
authors’ suggested interpretation for the reasons articulated in 
the prior discussion on CERD Article 4.150 While a series of 
reservations could unfortunately help to solidify an 
interpretation of Article 20 that permits broad speech bans, 
the issuance of “understandings” that commemorate the UN 
Human Rights Committee and UN Special Rapporteur’s 
interpretations of Articles 19 and 20 would be more productive 
because they would indicate support for a more limited scope 
for this article. 
An understanding, for example, could note that any 
restriction imposed under Article 20 must pass Article 19’s 
tripartite test, as the UN Human Rights Committee 
recommends.151 Such an understanding would build 
momentum to limit the potential scope of Article 20.152 As 
analyzed previously, it will be difficult for bans on offensive 
speech to pass the legality condition as many restrictions will 
be vague.153 It will also be very difficult for a government to 
prove it does not have any good governance means except a 
broad ban on speech to achieve a legitimate objective when the 
offensive speech is not linked to violence or other harms in the 
near term.154 The understanding could also highlight that 
ICCPR Article 20 contains an intent element and requires a 
“real and imminent” threat of harm, as the UN Special 
Rapporteur noted.155 Again, understandings that 
commemorate the substance of the UN human rights 
machinery’s recommended interpretations156 would help 
 
 150. See supra notes 136–142 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 152. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra notes 37–46 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 47–64 and accompanying text. 
 155. See UN SR 2012 Report, supra note 90, at ¶ 46 (explaining that “the 
“intent of the speaker to incite discrimination, hostility or violence” and the 
“real and imminent danger of violence resulting from the expression” are key 
factors in assessing whether speech incites harms). 
 156. See supra notes 31–83 and accompanying text. 
TO PROTECT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 651 
 
achieve the authors’ goal of promoting broad speech 
protections. Why not steal victory (broad speech protections) 
from the jaws of potential defeat (ICCPR Article 20) by 
emphasizing the UN machinery’s recommended 
interpretations and promoting widespread acceptance and 
implementation of these existing interpretations? 
C. “Vague” and “Anachronistic” Reasons for Governmental 
Speech Restrictions 
The authors express concerns that terms such as “public 
morals” in ICCPR Article 19(3) and “propaganda for war” in 
ICCPR Article 20 are vague and “should not be relied on to 
justify the criminalization of insults.”157 They recommend such 
terms “should be defined more precisely” or “states should 
enter reservations or declarations in respect of these terms.”158 
If the “defining” of these terms implicates re-negotiating the 
ICCPR text to include definitions, such a course of action is 
likely to result in a roll-back for freedom of expression rather 
than a narrowing of these terms for the reasons discussed 
above.159 The lodging of reservations by future ICCPR State 
Parties would also likely backfire as reservations lamenting 
the breadth of these terms would give momentum to existing 
State Parties’ claims about the broad scope of governmental 
prerogatives under Article 20.160 
Issuance of understandings or, as the authors suggest, 
“declarations”161 would be preferable to a reservation, as 
previously discussed.162 Such understandings or declarations 
 
 157. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 54. ICCPR Article 19(3) lists 
“public morals” as one of the reasons that governments can invoke to restrict 
speech. See ICCPR, supra note 24, at art. 19(3) (“The exercise of the 
rights . . . may therefore be subject to certain restrictions . . . [f]or the 
protection of . . . public . . . morals.”); see also id. art. 20(1) (“Any propaganda 
for war shall be prohibited by law.”). 
 158. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 54. 
 159. See supra notes 131–134 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra notes 140–142 and accompanying text. 
 161. MURPHY, supra note 141, at 94 (“A declaration is a statement 
expressing the state’s position or opinion on matters relating [to] the treaty, 
such as whether to accept an optional form of binding dispute resolution.”). 
 162. See supra notes 136–142 and accompanying text. 
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could cite to the substance of existing UN human rights 
machinery definitions of these terms that have sought to limit 
their scope. For example, the UN Human Rights Committee 
sought to narrow the potential discretion of governments when 
they seek to justify speech bans based on “public morals” when 
it took the position that “‘the purpose of protecting public 
morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively 
from a single tradition. Any such limitations must be 
understood in the light of universality of human rights and the 
principle of non-discrimination.”163 Referring to such 
interpretations in future understandings or declarations could 
give additional momentum to a restrictive scope to the grounds 
set forth in the “legitimacy” prong of ICCPR Article 19.164 
D. The Rights of Others 
The authors’ last recommendation at the international 
level is that ECHR Article 17165 and ICCPR Article 5166 “should 
not apply to freedom of expression cases, which should always 
be subject to a balancing test under Articles 10 and 19 of these 
conventions, respectively.”167 ECHR Article 17 and ICCPR 
 
 163. GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 32. 
 164. See supra notes 140–142 and accompanying text. 
 165. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 101, 
at art. 17 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for 
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent 
than is provided for in the Convention. 
 166. See ICCPR, supra note 24, at art. 5 
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as 
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any 
activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the 
rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a 
greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant. 2. 
There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the 
fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State 
Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, 
regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant 
does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a 
lesser extent. 
 167. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 54. 
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Article 5 provide that the respective treaties do not authorize 
activities or acts aimed at destroying the rights in the 
treaty.168 As the authors note, the European Court of Human 
Rights has interpreted ECHR Article 17 to mean that certain 
types of highly offensive speech are outside of the scope of the 
ECHR and thus do not enjoy protection under Article 10.169 
The authors also highlight that, although ICCPR Article 5 is 
analogous to ECHR Article 17, the UN Human Rights 
Committee applies Article 19’s tripartite test to all freedom of 
expression cases.170 
While I fully agree with the authors that ECHR Article 17 
and ICCPR Article 5 should not be applied in a fashion that 
prevents application of their respective convention’s speech 
protections, this problem exists solely within Europe’s regional 
human rights system and not in the international system. 
Though it is of course important to remain vigilant that such a 
concept not migrate from the regional ECHR jurisprudence 
into the international human rights system, it is unclear that 
any action is needed with respect to the international system 
on this topic. It is also important for human rights advocates 
and scholars to encourage the European Court of Human 
Rights to cease its guillotine-like application of Article 17 and 
instead assess the validity of all restrictions on speech.171 
Again, acknowledging and promoting the existing 
interpretations and practices at the UN level on this topic and 
advocating changes to the regional system is preferable to 
implying that European interpretations of European regional 
 
 168. See supra notes 165–166 and accompanying text.   
 169. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 22 
Article 17 has been interpreted [by the European Court of Human 
Rights] to mean that speech which is so odious that it could not 
possibly be protected under Article 10 of the Convention can be 
dealt with under Article 17, which allows a case to be struck out 
without examination of the merits. 
 170. See id. at 22 n.92 (“Article 5 of the ICCPR is analogous to Article 17 
of the ECHR, but the Human Rights Committee has not used it to strike out 
cases without considering the merits under Article 19 or 20 of the ICCPR.”). 
 171. See id. at 22 (explaining how ECHR Article 17 functions as a 
guillotine-like “provision because it does not involve any balancing of the 
right to free expression against the other values protected in Article 10”). 
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human rights instruments create problems within the UN’s 
international human rights system. 
E. Reflections on Ways Forward to Promote Free Expression 
Given that “the tide around the world is turning against 
free speech,”172 seeking to re-negotiate or amend these treaties 
to promote broad speech protections at the international level 
is inadvisable because governments would likely develop 
treaty text that undermines existing international speech 
protections. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s attempt 
to develop a protocol to the CERD that would have 
criminalized the “defamation of religions” concept was a recent 
case study in which such a scenario almost played out.173 Even 
European governments have sought to diminish speech 
protections in the international system by invoking the 
European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence when 
defending their domestic laws before the UN’s machinery.174 
It is also inadvisable to encourage states to take 
reservations that lament and commemorate broad 
interpretations of the mandatory bans on speech that exist in 
the ICCPR and CERD. Instead, states that join these treaties 
should be encouraged to issue understandings upon 
ratification that reinforce the substance of the UN human 
rights machinery’s recent interpretations, including those that 
apply ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test to mandatory speech 
bans and otherwise limit the potential scope of ICCPR Article 
20 and CERD Article 4. Such understandings could propel 
more restrictive interpretations of ICCPR Article 20 and 
CERD Article 4 rather than fueling broader readings of these 
provisions.175 
That said, it is unclear if the small number of countries 
that have not yet joined these treaties would do so with 
understandings that promote freedom of expression.176 An 
 
 172. Id. at 55. 
 173. See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text. 
 174. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra Part II.A–II.B. 
 176. See supra notes 138–149 and accompanying text. 
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important avenue for human rights advocacy therefore is to 
encourage and promote the UN human rights machinery’s 
most recent interpretations in a variety of ways.177 For 
example, human rights advocates should be vigilant to make 
sure there is not backsliding on these interpretations by the 
UN human rights machinery, which is constantly under 
governmental pressure to expand the scope of acceptable 
speech restrictions.178 Advocates should engage with the treaty 
bodies and the UN Special Rapporteur on the range of their 
work (e.g., reviewing states’ human rights records, considering 
individual complaints, and issuing interpretative guidance) 
and continue to reinforce the proper implementation of these 
interpretations in the bodies’ ongoing work. If the UN Human 
Rights Committee or the UN CERD Committee revisit the 
scope of acceptable speech restrictions in future general 
comments or recommendations, human rights advocates 
should actively participate in those public consultations. In 
addition, human rights advocates should carefully monitor and 
engage during the selection processes for candidates for the 
UN’s treaty monitoring bodies and special rapporteur positions 
to ensure that selected persons hold views on speech that align 
with the most recent UN guidance. To facilitate the migration 
of UN norms on speech to the regional systems, human rights 
advocates can highlight UN approaches in advocacy efforts at 
the regional level. 
In essence, freedom of expression advocates should 
actively seek to entrench the victories that have been achieved 
both in the text of ICCPR Article 19 and in the most recent 
interpretations by the UN human rights machinery. These 
 
 177. Such interpretations include those relating to ICCPR Article 19’s 
tripartite test, the application of Article 19’s tripartite test to ICCPR Article 
20 and CERD Article 4 and the understanding that “incitement” requires 
findings of an intent to incite, the likelihood of harm, and the imminence of 
that harm. See supra notes 26–73, 80–82 and accompanying text. These 
interpretations by the UN’s human rights machinery are reasonable 
interpretations of the textual language in the ICCPR and CERD and help to 
realize the authors’ vision for broad protections for freedom of expression, 
even insulting or offensive speech. 
 178. See Alberto Cerda Silva, supra note 127 (reporting that there is a 
“global assault on freedom of expression” as “governments are stretching the 
meaning of what’s permitted” under ICCPR Article 19). 
656 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 609 (2020) 
 
advocates should pursue an active strategy of stealing victory 
(broad speech protections) from the jaws of potential defeat 
(ICCPR Article 20 and CERD Article 4) by promoting 
consistent application of positive interpretations recommended 
by the UN machinery. 
IV. Concluding Recommendations 
So where does all this leave us with respect to concerns 
that anchoring content moderation to international human 
rights law risks insufficient protections for speech as well as 
confusion because of inconsistent norms? With respect to the 
international regime’s scope of coverage for offensive speech, 
the ICCPR’s rigorous tripartite test of legality, necessity, and 
legitimacy, which applies to all speech restrictions (including 
the mandatory bans in ICCPR Article 20 and CERD Article 4), 
goes a long way towards accomplishing the authors’ vision of 
broad international law protections for freedom of expression. 
Many laws that ban such speech will fail because they are 
either vague or do not reflect the least intrusive means to 
achieve a public interest objective. In many instances, 
governments can deploy good governance measures that do not 
require banning speech. Indeed, the UN human rights 
machinery has explicitly and repeatedly condemned the 
practice of restricting speech to protect rulers, religions or 
royalty. ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test and recent 
recommendations by both UN treaty bodies and the UN 
Special Rapporteur179 are extremely helpful in protecting 
offensive speech and paving the way to fulfill the authors’ 
vision for broad speech protections. 
What about the concern that this body of international law 
is afflicted by unworkable contradictions? Part of the basis of 
this concern seems to have been an inappropriate conflation of 
the UN’s human rights regime with the various regional 
human rights regimes. The international system does provide 
different (and often greater) speech protections than the 
regional systems, but that does not render the international 
system incoherent. It simply means there are different systems 
 
 179. For a summary of such interpretations, see supra Part II.A.  
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that interpret different treaties and come out differently in 
their interpretations. While this is an unfortunate state of 
affairs for a variety of reasons, it does not mean the UN’s 
human rights regime is incoherent or riddled with 
inconsistencies. To the extent the concern about inconsistency 
was based upon cited discrepancies within the UN machinery’s 
interpretations, those differences are best attributed to an 
evolution in the thinking of UN bodies, which evinces a trend 
toward greater speech protections. 
Having analyzed the specific arguments in The Right to 
Insult in International Law, I continue to believe that the 
international human rights regime, particularly ICCPR Article 
19, remains a useful resource for private platforms to 
incorporate into their content moderation policies. But what 
does that mean in practical terms? How can ICCPR Article 
19’s tripartite test be translated into a corporate context? 
As the UN Special Rapporteur explained in 2018, in order 
to avoid infringing on international freedom of expression 
rights, platforms would first need to develop speech codes that 
do not contain vague bans on speech.180 The UN human rights 
machinery has provided ample guidance about what 
constitutes a vague speech ban.181 Is it not fair to hold global 
platforms, which are the most powerful speech regulators in 
the world, to a standard that prohibits them from imposing 
vague speech bans? 
The platforms would also need to determine whether they 
are choosing the “least intrusive” means when imposing speech 
restrictions.182 First, the companies would need to assess if 
they have means at their disposal to achieve the desired goals 
without infringing on speech. In practical terms, they might 
 
 180. See UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶¶ 26, 27 (highlighting 
examples of platform speech codes that contain vague phrasing); see also 
Aswad, supra note 30, at 46–47 (assessing Twitter’s hate speech rules under 
ICCPR Article 19’s vagueness test). 
 181. See supra Part II.A.1.   
 182. See UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 47 (advocating for 
companies to properly explain how they narrowly tailor restrictions on their 
platforms and how they choose the least intrusive infringements on speech); 
Aswad, supra note 30, at 47–52 (discussing how Article 19’s necessity test 
would apply to Twitter’s decision making when assessing hate speech). 
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consider whether they can promote digital and media literacy 
campaigns, speak out on issues, promote dialogues and 
counter-narrative approaches on contentious issues, or make 
technical changes to their platforms. If implementing such 
“good governance” measures would be insufficient, they would 
need to analyze if they are selecting the least intrusive means 
for restricting speech on their continuum of options, which 
include adding friction to access offensive speech, demoting 
speech, geo-blocking, and many more avenues.183 Finally, 
companies would need to assess if the selected means is likely 
to work or be counterproductive. This trilogy of questions 
reflects the due diligence that companies would need to engage 
in to assure their speech restrictions are “necessary.” Again, is 
it not fair to hold the most powerful speech regulators in 
human history to a standard that requires refraining from 
infringing on individuals’ speech beyond what is necessary? 
The trickiest part of translating ICCPR Article 19’s 
tripartite test into a corporate context is the “legitimacy” 
prong. Are companies well situated to make public interest 
determinations, or would their profit-seeking motives 
ultimately undermine such assessments? As I have argued 
previously, this prong requires further multi-stakeholder 
consultation to develop a way forward.184 It may be that this 
prong should be excluded in the corporate context (which 
means companies would only be held to the legality and 
necessity conditions of the ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test). 
Alternatively, companies could be required to articulate which 
public interest goals they are pursuing with specificity and 
evidence-based arguments, subject to heightened scrutiny 
because of their brand management incentives when seeking 
to ban content. 
 
 183. See Aswad, supra note 30, at 50 (analyzing some of the options 
available to platforms to restrict speech, including deleting specific posts but 
still allowing the user to utilize the platform and issuing warnings to users 
who continuously violate “a company’s speech code”). 
 184. See id. at 52–57 (“Applying the third prong of Article 19(3)’s 
tripartite test raises a number of questions that would benefit from further 
conversations by interested stakeholders to assess the contours of what is 
feasible and to avoid corporations invoking public interest rationales as 
pretexts for revenue-driven decisions.”). 
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We are at a liminal moment in which global social media 
companies are deciding whether to align their worldwide 
speech moderation with international human rights law. This 
international regime provides a useful framework and 
significant guidance that these companies can deploy in the 
content moderation context, particularly with respect to 
ICCPR Article 19’s legality and necessity conditions. The 
existing international regime that governs freedom of 
expression has the benefit of reigning in the vast discretion of 
platforms in content moderation through the use of a 
principled framework that has the added benefit of legitimacy 
rooted in global standards. We should be encouraging 
companies to voluntarily align their content moderation 
policies with this international regime. 
In other words, this is another opportunity to steal victory 
(i.e., broad international protections for freedom of expression 
for billions) from the jaws of potential defeat (i.e., vague 
corporate speech bans that can be imposed without regard to 
workable measures that infringe less on expression). So why 
not steal victory from the jaws of defeat? 
